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La rubrique « Pistes pour l’action » publie des points de vue individuels, à visée opérationnelle, 
qui prolongent les articles d’analyse. Jakob von Weizsäcker ouvre la série, en proposant de 
créer une blue card européenne, système à points inspiré de la green card américaine. L’auteur 
a déjà étudié cette question dans un précédent papier publié par le think tank Bruegel.       
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Summary Summary Summary Summary       
     
This contribution argues that the EU should open up to skilled immigrants through a points system via a 
European “Blue Card” granting access to its entire labour market. This European version of the Green 
C a r d  c o u l d  b e c o m e  a  p o w e r f u l  c o m p l e m e n t  t o  a n y  n a t i o n a l  e f f o r t  t o  a t t r a c t  t o p  t a l e n t .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  
students  graduating  with  a  Masters  degree  or  equivalent  from  European  universities  or  from  top 
universities abroad should be automatically eligible for a Blue Card. This “Blue Diploma” would help 
attract young talent early. Finally, in future rounds of EU enlargement, higher-skilled workers should be 
we lco me  immediatel y, p rovid ed they rea ch an earnin gs threshol d: the “Ex terna l Mi nimum Wage”. To 
motivate  the  discussion,  a  tentative  explanation  why  countries like  Germany  and  France  are  lagging 
behind in the global competition for talent is provided. In Section 2, the basic facts of migration, its skill 
content, and the increasing supply of skills worldwide are examined. In Section 3 the basic efficiency and 
distribution  arguments  for  and  against  high  and  low-skilled  migration  are  analysed.  The  impact  of 
emigration - “brawn drain” and “brain drain” - on developing source countries is also discussed. Finally, 
Section 4 proposes potential policy options for Europe. 
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This contribution argues that the EU should open up to skilled immigrants through a points system via a 
European “Blue Card” granting access to its entire labour market. This European version of the Green 
C a r d  c o u l d  b e c o m e  a  p o w e r f u l  c o m p l e m e n t  t o  a n y  n a t i o n a l  e f f o r t  t o  a t t r a c t  t o p  t a l e n t .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  
students  graduating  with  a  Masters  degree  or  equivalent  from  European  universities  or  from  top 
universities abroad should be automatically eligible for a Blue Card. This “Blue Diploma” would help 
attract young talent early. Finally, in future rounds of EU enlargement, higher-skilled workers should be 
welcome immediately, provided they reach an earnings threshold: the “External Minimum Wage”. 
 
To motivate the discussion, a tentative explanation why countries like Germany and France are lagging 
behind in the global competition for talent is provided. In Section 2, the basic facts of migration, its skill 
content, and the increasing supply of skills worldwide are examined. In Section 3 the basic efficiency and 
distribution  arguments  for  and  against  high  and  low-skilled  migration  are  analysed.  The  impact  of 
emigration - “brawn drain” and “brain drain” - on developing source countries is also discussed. Finally, 
Section 4 proposes potential policy options for Europe. 
 
 
1.  1.  1.  1.        Laggards in a global competition for talent Laggards in a global competition for talent Laggards in a global competition for talent Laggards in a global competition for talent       
 
Why are Germany and France finding it so difficult to effectively participate in the global competition for 
talent? Germany’s new immigration law of 2004 was touted as an important step forward to attract more 
high-skilled immigrants. But during 2005, less than 1000 high-skilled immigrants came to Germany under 
the restrictive and timid provisions under that law. France is currently discussing an immigration bill that 
also  contains  provisions  for  high-skilled  immigration.  However,  the  special  provisions  regarding 
“compétences et talents” don’t seem to be a particularly courageous step forward either. 
 
One explanation for this might be the popular but flawed idea that the capacity for absorbing immigrants 
is essentially fixed, say at 100 000 per year, and the only question is: How should these immigration slots 
be allocated? If the number of slots were fixed, a moral case could be made to give the available slots to 
the  most  deserving:  those  suffering  from  political  persecution,  from  abject  poverty,  from  family 
separation.  And  an  economic  case  could  be  made  that  the  slots  should  be  given  those  who  would 
benefit the local economy the most: highly skilled immigrants. Thus, there would be a head-on conflict 
between what is morally right and what is in the national interest. 
 
But  reality  is  different.  The  number  of  migrants  that  a  country  is  willing  to  absorb  is  not  fixed.  In 
particular, the immigration of high-skilled workers need not reduce the capacity to absorb less skilled 
and perhaps morally more deserving migration. This is illustrated in Table 1. Canada, Switzerland, and 
Australia, the countries with a points system for immigration, have a strong bias in favour of highly skilled 
immigrants. But this does not appear to have come at the expense of less skilled immigrants. Foreign 
born without tertiary education make up only 8 percent of the population in France, the Netherlands and 
Belgium, and 11 percent of the population in Germany. By contrast, in the three countries with a points 
system, the foreign born without tertiary education amount to 12 percent of the population in Canada, 
14 percent of the population in Australia, and 17 percent of the population in Switzerland.  Jakob von Weizsäcker – A European Blue Card Proposal 
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Table  Table  Table  Table 1  1  1  1 – – – – International comparison of the extent and skill composition of migration  International comparison of the extent and skill composition of migration  International comparison of the extent and skill composition of migration  International comparison of the extent and skill composition of migration 
 















skilled as of: 
Poland  2,1  10,4  11,9  0,2  N/A 
Spain  5,3  19,4  21,8  1,2  N/A 
Portugal  6,3  7,7  19,3  1,2  N/A 
Denmark  6,8  18,8  19,5  1,3  N/A 
United Kingdom  8,3  20,1  34,8  2,9  2007* 
France  10,0  16,9  18,1  1,8  N/A 
Netherlands  10,1  19,5  17,6  1,8  N/A 
Belgium  10,7  22,9  21,6  2,3  N/A 
Sweden  12,0  22,8  24,2  2,9  N/A 
United States  12,3  26,9  25,9  3,2  N/A 
Germany  12,5  19,5  15,5  1,9   N/A 
Canada  19,3  31,5  38,0  7,3  1967 
Switzerland  22,4  18,1  23,7  5,3  1996 
Australia  23,0  38,6  42,9  9,9   1984 
Source: Dumont and Lemaître (2004) 
Note: *Expected date following announcement by UK Home Office in March 2006 
 
Thus,  decisions  on  high-skilled  immigration  and  on  low-skilled  immigration  can  to  a  large  extent  be 
treated  separately.  But  should  they  be?  Economic  effects  of  high-skilled  immigration  are  generally 
p o si ti ve  f o r  th e  r e c ei vi ng  c o u n tr y w h i l e  l o w -s k i l le d  m i g ra ti o n  ha s m o r e  a m bi g uo u s e f fe c ts, a s sh o w n  
further below. Hence, decisions about attracting more high-skilled immigration will tend to be relatively 
easy. By contrast, decisions regarding low-skilled migration often prove highly complex and controversial 
for  both  economic  and  non-economic  reasons.  By  bundling  the  discussion  of  high  and  low-skilled 
migration together, many European countries, including France and Germany, are loosing valuable time 
in the global competition for talent.  
 
Therefore, there would appear to be a strong case to treat the issues of high-skilled and low-skilled 
migration  separately.  This  is  reinforced  by  the  potentially  benign  effect  that  successful  high-skilled 
immigration  policies  might  have  on  the  politics  of  low-skilled  immigration.  Greater  numbers  of 
immigration success stories in the economic and scientific arena could help to reduce any exaggerated 
anxieties associated with immigration and immigrants overall.  
 
In order to attract more highly skilled migrants, this article proposes the introduction of a “Blue Card”, a 
European version of the US Green Card that would provide highly skilled third country nationals with 
instant access to the entire European labour market. The Blue Card would be allocated on the basis of 
skill through a Europe wide points system. Such an EU wide system would be more attractive than any 
national system from the perspective of high-skilled immigrants. Also, a European solution would provide 
greater visibility, predictability, and transparency than 25 different national systems.  
 
 
2 2 2 2.  .  .  .        Migration and the global supply of skills Migration and the global supply of skills Migration and the global supply of skills Migration and the global supply of skills       
 
Immigration rates in the  EU-15 and the US remained at relatively moderate  levels during the 1960s, 
1970s, and most of the 1980s, as shown in Chart 1. Migration rates only shot up in the late eighties and 
early  nineties.  They  rose  again  substantially  in  the  early  2000s  in  Europe  in  particular,  driven  by 
immigration to the EU-15 from Eastern Europe. In addition, there is significant illegal immigration. 
 Centre d’analyse stratégique – Revue Horizons stratégiques n° 1/juillet 2006 
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Chart  Chart  Chart  Chart 1 1 1 1       – – – – recent increase in immigration to the EU and the US  recent increase in immigration to the EU and the US  recent increase in immigration to the EU and the US  recent increase in immigration to the EU and the US       
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Source: Eurostat, US Office of Immigration Statistics, US Census Bureau 
 
Over the coming years, migration rates and migration pressures might well increase further. Globalisation 
is rapidly “shrinking” the world without shrinking worldwide income differences quite as fast. There are 
concerns in Europe over this influx of immigrants, and low-skilled immigrants in particular. At the same 
time, to become a competitive and dynamic knowledge-driven economy as spelled out in the Lisbon 
agenda, Europe will need to become much better at attracting talent from the rest of the world. The 
European Commission has accordingly become active in this area (Box 1). 
 
However, progress has been slow. Some of the reasons for this have already been mentioned in the 
previous section. In addition, many relevant stakeholders still use problematic economic concepts to 
discuss migration, most importantly the “lump-of-labour” fallacy according to which the number of jobs 
in an economy is fixed. This policy brief argues that the issue of economic migration should instead be 
framed in terms of the skill level of immigrants. 
 
Box  Box  Box  Box 1: EU 1: EU 1: EU 1: EU- - - -Leve Leve Leve Level Activity on Economic Migration l Activity on Economic Migration l Activity on Economic Migration l Activity on Economic Migration       B o x   Box  Box  Box 2: The Canadian Example of a Points 2: The Canadian Example of a Points 2: The Canadian Example of a Points 2: The Canadian Example of a Points- - - -Based  Based  Based  Based 
Immigration System Immigration System Immigration System Immigration System       
A  recent  Policy  Plan  on  Legal  Migration  (European 
Commission  2005)  outlines  the  initiatives  the 
European Commission intends to take over the 2006-
2009 period. This plan is based on the Green Paper, 
“On  an  EU  Approach  to  Managing  Economic 
Migration”,  of  January  2005,  and  the  wide 
consultation that followed. 
I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  a  f r a m e w o r k  d i r e c t i v e  i s  p l a n n e d  i n  
order to define a common set of basic rights granted 
to  migrant  workers.  Furthermore,  four  specific 
directives would be designed to discipline the entry 
and  residence  of  particular  types  of  immigrants, 
namely  highly-skilled  and  seasonal  workers,  intra-
corporate transferees and remunerated trainees. 
One of the main objectives is to make the EU more 
attractive to high-skilled migrants. Whether this could 
b e  ac hi e ve d th ro u g h a n EU  wo r k p e r mi t , si mi l a r  to  
the  Blue  Card  proposed  in  the  brief,  is  under 
discussion.       
 
The points system for  immigration was pioneered 
by Canada in 1967 and its skills bias was reinforced 
in 2001. Under the current rules, a foreign applicant 
must  have  previous  work  experience  as  a  skilled 
worker to be eligible for treatment under the points 
system. Then, to be able to become established in 
Canada, a minimum of 67 points out of 96 has to 
be awarded on the basis of the following factors: 
-  Education (up to 25 pts)   
-  Proficiency in the official languages (up to 
20 pts) 
-  Experience (up to 21 pts) 
-  Age with more points for younger migrants 
(up to 10 pts) 
-  Arranged employment (up to 10 pts) 
-  Adaptability  including  family  ties  to 
Canada (up to 10 pts) 
These  factors  aim  at  capturing  not  only  the 
economic  potential  but  also  the  likelihood  of  a 
successful integration.       Jakob von Weizsäcker – A European Blue Card Proposal 
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The differences in both the extent and the skill composition of migration, among developed countries, are 
striking. In particular, the percentage of highly-skilled foreign-born in the entire population varies widely, 
as highlighted by Table 1.  
 
Australia, Canada, and Switzerland have been phenomenally successful in attracting large numbers of 
migrants with a strong bias towards high-skilled immigration. All three countries have a points-based 
system for attracting high-skilled immigrants (Box 2). 
 
In  mid-range  immigration  countries,  the  picture  is  much  more  varied.  Germany,  for  example,  has 
attracted disproportionate numbers of low-skilled immigrants, consistent with its historically large guest 
worker program. In other European countries, migration from former colonies, often in the aftermath of 
independence, has played a more important role. In particular, it is worth pointing out that Spain, a 
country  with  a  relatively  low  stock  of  immigrants,  is  presently  experiencing  a  massive  surge  in 
immigration, not least from South America almost 200 years after most countries of that continent gained 
independence.  
 
However, it seems that English-speaking countries generally have a distinct advantage in attracting high-
skilled migrants, because English is the most widespread second language in the world. This also makes 
universities  in  English  speaking  countries  more  attractive  internationally.  This  English  language 
advantage sometimes leads other countries to conclude that they shouldn’t even try to engage in the 
global competition for talent. How about trying even harder instead? 
 
Contrary to popular perception, the US does not seem to have this high-skilled bias in its migration. The 
reason is that the high skill bias of migration to the US from many countries of the world cancels out with 
the low skill migration bias of the large influx of immigrants from Mexico. 
 
But what if many more countries followed the examples of Canada, Switzerland, and Australia? Would 
those other countries simply be competing for the same scarce international supply of skilled labour? 
Chart 2 helps to dispel this concern. Over the last 15 years, the number of students in tertiary education 
has increased dramatically. 
 
Chart  Chart  Chart  Chart 2  2  2  2 – – – – Number of students in tertiary education  Number of students in tertiary education  Number of students in tertiary education  Number of students in tertiary education       
Country (pop.)  1990 2004 (% pop.) 
EU an EU an EU an EU and proximity (958m) d proximity (958m) d proximity (958m) d proximity (958m)        21 36 (3,8%) 
 > EU-15 (381m)  9,7 13,7 (3,6%) 
 > EU-10 (74m)  1 3,3 (4,5%) 
 > EU Accession countries (74m)  0,4 0,9 (3,0%) 
 > EU Potential candidates (91m)  1 2,3 (2,6%) 
  >> Turkey (72m)  0,7 1,9 (2,7%) 
 > EU-Neighbourhood and Russia (382m)  9,3 16 (4,2%) 
  >> Russia (143m)  5,1 8,1 (5,7%) 
POP POP POP POP- - - -10 (3,474m) 10 (3,474m) 10 (3,474m) 10 (3,474m)        16,3 41,7 (1,2%) 
 > China (1,297m)  3,8 15,2 (1,2%) 
 > India (1,080m)  5 11,3 (1,0%) 
North North North North- - - -America and Antipodes (350m) America and Antipodes (350m) America and Antipodes (350m) America and Antipodes (350m)        16,2 19 (5,4%) 
 > US (394m)  13,7 16,6 (5,7%) 
       Centre d’analyse stratégique – Revue Horizons stratégiques n° 1/juillet 2006 
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EU and proximity (958m)
> EU-15 (381m)
> EU-10 (74m)
> EU Accession countries (74m)
> EU Potential candidates (91m)
>> Turkey (72m)





North-America and Antipodes (350m)
> US (394m)
1990 2004
       
Source: Edstats (World Bank) 
Notes: Nearest available year used when student data missing for 1990 or 2004. *Bosnia & Herzogovina, 
Armenia, Palestinian Authority, and Syria not included in “EU & proximity” due to missing data. 
 
Today, the share of students in the population is in fact lower in the old EU member states (EU-15) than 
in the new member states (EU-10) or the wider EU neighbourhood (EU Neighbourhood Policy Countries 
+ Russia). Turkey is also catching up rapidly. 
 
Even more striking is the increasing supply of skill among the Pop-10
1, the 10 most populous economies 
outside the US and Europe. Over the last 15 years, the Pop-10 have collectively increased their numbers 
o f  stu d e n ts b y 1 56 % . A s a  r e su l t, th e y n o w  ha ve  m o r e stu d e n ts th a n  th e e n la rg e d  E U an d  the  US  
combined. 
 
Overall,  tertiary  education  rates  have  been  converging  much  faster  than  incomes.  As  a  result,  no 
shortage  of  young  and  high-skilled  migrants  is  to  be  expected  any  time  soon.  If  Europe  wants  to 
welcome more high-skilled migrants, it can. 
 
 
3 3 3 3.  .  .  .        Eff Eff Eff Efficiency reasons for migration: a primer iciency reasons for migration: a primer iciency reasons for migration: a primer iciency reasons for migration: a primer       
 
Economic migration can loosely be defined as any cross-border migration that occurs to take on a better 
paid job. If pay is broadly in line with productivity, a move to a better paid job thus increases global 
economic output. This is the fundamental efficiency argument in favour of migration. 
 
But most people would prefer to stay at home if it wasn’t for the money. Therefore, why not upgrade 
productivity  where  the  people  currently  are  instead  of  having  people  chase  more  productive  jobs 
abroad? International trade and cross-border movement of capital are helping to do just that. According 
to the classic factor price equalisation theorem of trade theory, wages might in principle be equalised 
internationally through the trade of goods alone! However, there are important reasons why migration 
pressures are likely to persist even under free trade, full mobility of capital, and flexible labour markets 
domestically. 
 
F i r st, m a n y p oo r  co u n tri es su f f e r  f ro m a n  i n fe ri o r  “p r o du c ti o n  fun c tio n ” bec a u se  o f  po o r  in sti tu ti o n s . 
Despite  recent  development  success  stories,  upgrading  poor  institutions  is  a  slow  process.  In  the 
                                                 
1 China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Mexico, Vietnam, Philippines. Jakob von Weizsäcker – A European Blue Card Proposal 
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meantime, workers in many developing countries will continue to suffer from inferior wages. Migration 
can  short-circuit  this  development  problem  by  allowing  workers  move  to  locations  with  a  better 
“production function” immediately. 
 
Second, agglomeration effects are an important rationale for migration. For example, France and the UK 
are large countries with fairly uniform institutions, free trade and free movement of capital. Nevertheless, 
workers  continue  to  migrate  to  extremely  expensive  and  crowded  places  like  London  or  Paris.  The 
reason is that people become more productive by virtue of geographic concentration. By moving to a 
large agglomeration, often in a foreign country, they can also hope to greatly improve the match between 
their skill and their job, thus boosting their productivity. 
 
In  summary,  important  factors  driving  migration  today  include  good  institutions  and  agglomeration 
effects. In both areas, Europe is well positioned. In view of these important efficiency arguments
2 for 
migration, why is free migration such a remote prospect? Besides non-economic factors, distributional 
concerns are the main reason. 
 
The basic argument is easily understood: Almost by definition, the migrant himself or herself derives 
benefits  from  a  higher  wage  abroad.  In  the  host  country,  wages  of  workers  with  labour  market 
characteristics similar to those of the migrant can be expected to marginally decline while the income of 
those with different skills increases. Beneficiaries typically include people with different skills and owners 
of capital and land. In the source country, the wage impact will be a mirror image: the wage prospects of 
workers similar to the emigrant are set to improve while those with complementary factors of production 
would tend to suffer somewhat. 
 
On that basis, low-skilled immigrants will tend to increase income inequality among the native population 
in the host country as the already below average wages of low-skilled natives will come under additional 
pressure. By analogous arguments, high-skilled migration has a benign distributional impact in the host 
country and an adverse distributional impact in the source country. Ultimately, these opposing effects 
b e t w e e n  d i f f e r e n t  s k i l l  g r o u p s  a n d  d i f f e r e n t  c o u n t r i e s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  b e  a t  t h e  c o r e  o f  a n y  e c o n o m i c  
controversy over migration. 
 
However, while this theoretical argument is simple and compelling, it has been surprisingly difficult to 
find convincing empirical evidence to support it. In their analysis of empirical surveys, Longhi et al. (2005, 
2006) find only a minute “consensus estimate” of the distributional impact: a one per cent increase in 
immig rati on o nly lead s to a 0.12%  decl in e in  wages withi n the relevant ski ll  segmen t a nd a 0 .0 24% 
decline in employment. 
 
If this were true, it would be wonderful news. Essentially, one could stop worrying about the distributional 
implications of migration altogether. However, as Borjas (2003) has pointed out, most of the empirical 
studies that fail to find a significant distributional impact of migration focus on the impact of immigration 
on  wages  in  small  geographic  areas.  But  such  an  approach  fails  to  control  for  the  endogeneity  of 
migration. Migrants tend to be attracted to locations that have the most vibrant local economies and 
therefore typically the most attractive wages. Hence, any negative wage impact of immigration might be 
hidden by above-average wages in areas that manage to attract the largest numbers of migrants. 
 
By applying an econometric approach immune to this particular concern, Borjas (2003) and Aydemir and 
Borjas (2006) obtain substantially higher estimates of the wage impact of migration for the US, Canada, 
and Mexico. According to these studies, immigration of 1% reduces wages at the respective skill level by 
between 0.3 and 0.4% and migration could explain up to one third of the increase in the wage gap 
between low-skilled and high-skilled wages in the US over recent decades. Furthermore, Borjas finds in a 
simulation that any efficiency gains may well be tiny compared to these adverse distribution effects. 
 
                                                 
2 Strictly speaking, agglomeration effects need not improve overall efficiency, see Charlot et al. (2006). Centre d’analyse stratégique – Revue Horizons stratégiques n° 1/juillet 2006 
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But those findings are unlikely to mark the end of the empirical debate. Bonin (2005) applies Borjas’ 
methodology to German data and finds much smaller effects. Also, questions remain as to why the wage 
effects  of  classic  natural  experiments  like  the  Miami  Boatlift  and  the  mass  emigration  from  the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries have not been more marked. Finally, Ottaviano 
and Peri (2006) find significant complementarity of native and foreign workers within the same skill group 
and they argue that only the least skilled group of natives in the US are likely to experience a negative 
wage impact due to migration. 
 
In  summary,  the  empirical  literature  has  not  been  able  to  comprehensively  dispel  the  distributional 
concerns that come with low-skilled migration. Therefore, such concerns cannot be entirely dismissed at 
this stage. At the same time, it seems already clear that any adverse distributional effects of low-skilled 
migration have not been the most important factor in rising income inequality over recent years. Hence, 
attempts to lay much of the blame for the economic stagnation of low-skilled natives in recent years on 
immigrants are not only politically but also factually misguided.  
 
Assuming a welfare function that is inequality averse, the efficiency and distributional findings can now 
be  brought  together.  High-skilled  immigration  is  likely  to  increase  welfare  among  the  host  country 
population since both efficiency and equity are likely to be improved. By contrast, low-skilled immigration 
has an ambiguous welfare effect in the host country. It increases efficiency from the perspective of the 
native population provided that there is sufficient adjustment in the capital stock while it is probably 
somewhat widening the income gap between rich and poor in the host country. 
 
The  welfare  argument  in  favour  of  high-skilled  immigration  and  the  welfare  ambiguity  of  low-skilled 
immigration are reinforced by a number of additional aspects that have so far been neglected: 
 
!  The Fiscal Impact of Migration in a Welfare State 
 
Obviously, the net fiscal impact of a high-skilled immigrant tends to be substantially more favourable 
than the net fiscal impact of a low-skilled migrant. However, even low-skilled immigrants can make a 
positive net contribution to the welfare state since pay-as-you-go pensions impose a large burden on 
young migrants. 
 
!  Migration and Inflexible Labour Markets 
 
Low-skilled  workers  are  typically  more  affected  by  poorly  functioning  labour  markets  than  high-
s k i l l e d  w o r k e r s .  C h a r t  3  s h o w s  t h a t  t h e  u n e m p l o y m e n t  r a t e  o f  l o w - s k i l l e d  w o r k e r s  i n  E u r o p e  i s  
systematically higher than for high-skilled workers. On average, the former stands at 10% in the EU 
while the latter is only 5% and can primarily be explained by frictional unemployment. This suggests 
th a t th e  la b o u r  ma r ke t w il l  b e  a bl e  to  ab so r b h igh -s k i l led  m ig ra n ts m o re  re ad i l y tha n  lo w -sk i ll ed  
migrants.
3 While far from perfect, Chart 3 is at least likely to be better guide to migration policy than 
the  job  opening  statistics  that  are  often  used  to  assess  migration  needs.  This  is  because  job 
openings tend to be inflated, almost by definition, for sectors with high turnover which in turn is often 









                                                 
3 However, if the low-skilled unemployment is due to centralized wage setting coupled with low mobility, additional 
low-skilled  immigration  might  actually  reduce  unemployment  by  reducing  the  marginal  productivity  differentials 
between regions, as explained in Boeri and Brücker (2005). Jakob von Weizsäcker – A European Blue Card Proposal 
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Note: *Unemployment rates for worked aged 25 and over(Q2 of 2005). 
“High-Skilled” = Tertiary education; “Low-Skilled” = Primary and Lower Secondary only. 
 
!  Dangers of an Ethnic Underclass 
 
There  are  signs  that  certain  immigrant  communities  in  Europe  are  developing  into  an  ethnic 
underclass.  It  is  clear  that  much  better  education  and  improved  economic  opportunities  for  the 
children  of  low-skilled  migrants  already  in  Europe,  need  to  be  provided.  Migration  policies  can 
usefully complement such integration measures by creating a high-skill bias among fresh immigrants. 
Low-skilled immigrants already in Europe are the closest labour market substitutes to new low-skill 
i m m i g r a n t s .  H e n c e ,  b y  r e d u c i n g  t h e  i n f l o w  o f  a d d i t i o n a l  l o w - s k i l l e d  i m m i g r a n t s ,  t h e  e c o n o m i c  
prospects of existing low-skilled immigrant communities could probably be improved. 
 
For  the  source  country,  low-skilled  emigration  or  “brawn  drain”  typically  improves  welfare  as  it 
improves  both  efficiency  and  redistribution.  This  positive  impact  of  low-skilled  emigration  is 
reinforced  by  remittances.  Low-skilled  emigrants  will  often  help  to  support  poor  relatives  in  the 
source country with their higher earnings abroad. 
 
By contrast, the welfare impact of high-skilled emigration or “brain drain” is ambiguous. The source 
country may suffer from an adverse efficiency and distributional impact as a result of the brain drain. 
There will be fiscal loss since high-skilled emigrants will no longer pay taxes in their home country. 
And just as high-skilled migrants help to uplift their ethnic communities abroad, they could have 
made notable contributions to public life had they stayed at home. 
 
But a brain drain is not all bad for the source country. The option to emigrate may substantially 
increase  the  expected  returns  to  education,  thereby  improving  education  incentive.  Finally,  if 
migrants return to their country of origin, and many of them do, the skills and savings they have 
acquired abroad become a powerful force of development. Therefore, moderate levels of brain drain 
may actually be beneficial for the source country as, for example, argued in Beine et al. (2003). 
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The findings of the previous sections are summarised in Figure 1: high-skilled migration tends to improve 
the welfare of the host country while the welfare impact of migration on the source country is ambiguous. 
By contrast, low-skilled migration has an ambiguous welfare impact on the host country while generally 
improving welfare of the source country. Hence, there need not be a conflict of interest between source 
and host country but there may well be. This raises the question how could the positions of host and 
source country be reconciled, if indeed there were a conflict? 
 
Figure  Figure  Figure  Figure 1  1  1  1 – – – – Theoretical migration preferences  Theoretical migration preferences  Theoretical migration preferences  Theoretical migration preferences                                          
 
 
Unlike  trade,  migration  will  generally  require  international  compensating  transfers  instead  of  purely 
national ones if efficiency gains are in part to be used to compensate the losers. In particular, it will 
typically be necessary for a rich host country to share some of the gains from high-skilled migration, 
including the  gains from the  immigrants, with the poor source country. Perhaps the most prominent 
proposal in this respect is the Bhagwati tax, a special income tax  on the high-skilled immigrant the 
proceeds of which are to be transferred back to the source country in compensation for the migratory 
move. 
 
This tax may be difficult to implement in practice because of international cooperation, and some forms 
of tax discrimination based on the place of birth may not be constitutional under all circumstances, but 
Europe could certainly go a long way towards gaining the moral high ground simply by fulfilling last 
year’s commitments to significantly increase development aid as a percentage of GDP. More specifically, 
the EU could make a point of subsidising education systems as an increasing function of the net inflow 
from any particular source country. Alternatively, rich countries could allocate more work permits for low-
skilled  workers,  since  a  mixed  strategy  between  high-skilled  and  low-skilled  migration  could  also 
overcome the potential conflict of interest depicted in Figure 1. Additional possibilities are discussed in 
the next section. 
 
 
4 4 4 4. . . .        P  P  P  Policy proposals olicy proposals olicy proposals olicy proposals       
 
If  the  potential  distributional  problems  with  the  source  countries  can  be  fairly  resolved,  how  should 
Europe go about attracting high-skilled migrants? Before answering this question, the term “high-skilled” 
migrant needs a better practical definition. 
 
Perhaps the most obvious definition of skill would be based on formal qualifications. This also makes 
some economic sense since formal qualifications tend to be a fairly good predictor of future earnings 
potential. This is relevant since most migrants move in their 20s or early 30s when their current earnings 
are only a relatively poor predictor of future earnings potential. 
 
However, from an economic perspective, a definition of skill ought to go beyond formal qualifications. As 
long as an immigrant is likely to achieve high earnings in the host country, he could be argued to have 












? ? ? ?       
? ? ? ?       
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i s a  h ig hl y fl e x i b le  de f i n i tio n , c ap tu r i n g  al l  ki n d s o f p ro fe ssio nal  e xce l l en c e , i nc lu d i ng  sp o r ts su c h  a s  
football and creative professions, which are difficult to standardise. 
 
4.1. 4.1. 4.1. 4.1.           An EU An EU An EU An EU- - - -wide Blue Card for high wide Blue Card for high wide Blue Card for high wide Blue Card for high- - - -skilled skilled skilled skilled       migrants migrants migrants migrants       
 
In a points system of immigration, both definitions of skill can simply be used in parallel. In view of the 
high flexibility of points systems and their success in attracting high-skilled migrants, it seems likely that 
many European countries will adopt them over the coming years. 
 
This  raises  the  question  whether  there  is  any  room  for  European  involvement  regarding  high-skilled 
migration. High-skilled migrants could give rise to positive cross-border externalities within the EU similar 
to research and development. In principle, this argument might even be used to justify subsidies for 
attracting high-skilled migrants, perhaps in the form of a centrally financed Erasmus style programme to 
attract third country nationals. 
 
However,  before  going  down  the  route  of  explicit  subsidies,  the  attractiveness  of  Europe  could  be 
increased for free by providing third country nationals immediate access to the entire EU labour market. 
This will be more valuable from the perspective of the migrant than access to any national labour market 
due to the option value  of the additional markets. Also, such an  EU wide immigration regime would 
provide much greater visibility, predictability, and transparency than 25 different national systems. 
  
Therefore, it is recommended to introduce a “Blue Card”, a European Green Card that would provide 
highly skilled third country nationals with instant access to the entire European labour market. This Blue 
Card would be allocated on the basis of skill through a Europe wide points system. Overall, such a 
system should make it significantly easier for Europe to compete for top talent with countries like the US 
or Canada.  
 
However, national initiatives to attract more high-skilled immigrants need not wait until a European Blue 
Card is introduced. The reason is that for most EU member states is would appear to be in their narrow 
self-interest to attract greater numbers of high-skilled migrants. EU level coordination would merely help 
countries to get there faster, and to go even further.  
 
Sometimes, the concern is voiced that EU level coordination of high-skilled migration would make it 
difficult for countries to take needs into  account that are specific to any member state in particular. 
However, it is not obvious what the economic basis for this concern might be. If the rationale for EU level 
coordination  rests  indeed  on  the  argument  of  a  positive  externality  of  high-skilled  migrants,  any 
coordination of high-skilled migration policies would typically lead to more not less high-skilled migration 
than countries would be willing to accommodate individually. And since it would be subject to unanimous 
decision  making,  all  member  states  are  set  to  benefit  either  directly  or  indirectly  as  part  of  a  larger 
package.  
 
4.2.   4.2.   4.2.   4.2.  Blue Diplomas for  Blue Diplomas for  Blue Diplomas for  Blue Diplomas for foreign graduates foreign graduates foreign graduates foreign graduates       
 
As  one  particular  variant  of  the  Blue  Card,  an  entirely  qualification-based  “Blue  Diploma”  could  be 
introduced. Any graduate of a Masters programme (or equivalent) from a participating university could be 
made eligible for a Blue Card by virtue of his or her degree. Such a comprehensive and predictable 
arrangement would greatly help to attract foreign talent to European universities and to the European 
l a b o u r  m a r k e t  a f t e r w a r d s . I n  p r i n c i p l e , i t  w o u l d  m a k e  s e n se  t o  e x te n d  B l u e  D i p l o m a s  t o  u n i v e r s i ti e s  
outside  Europe  also.  For  a  start,  the  top  100  non-European  universities,  as  measured  by  academic 
excellence, should also be included in the scheme. 
 
Even from a development perspective, the Blue Diploma could turn out to be beneficial. By providing 
guaranteed  access  to  the  European  labour  market  without  requiring  a  permanent  presence,  circular 
migration in the spirit of the proposal by Weil (2006) would be encouraged. The Blue Card would in effect Centre d’analyse stratégique – Revue Horizons stratégiques n° 1/juillet 2006 
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act as an insurance policy for graduates from developing countries in case they would like to take the 
risk of going back home. They could always return to Europe for a second chance. 
 
4.3.   4.3.   4.3.   4.3.  An  An  An  An external minimum wage external minimum wage external minimum wage external minimum wage       
 
It  turns  out  that  the  skills-based  approach  of  migration  also  has  an  interesting  application  to  EU 
enlargement. For new rounds of EU enlargement (Bulgaria, Rumania, eventually Turkey), the question 
arises of how to manage the transition to full labour mobility. 
 
As with immigration from third countries, the old member states will typically be more readily persuaded 
to open up their labour markets for high-skilled than for low-skilled workers from new member states. 
Furthermore,  due  to  the  strictly  limited  duration  of  the  transition  process  to  full  labour  mobility,  the 
dangers of abuse  are less pronounced than they would  otherwise be. Hence, a simple salary-based 
approach can be used to introduce full mobility for high-skilled workers while delaying access for low-
skilled workers. 
 
Citizens of new EU member states would be allowed to enter work contracts that pay above an external 
minimum wage in all old member states. This wage floor could initially be set at the median wage in each 
old member state. With time, the external minimum wage could be lowered at a jointly agreed minimum 
pace to reach full free mobility. Of course, any old member state would be allowed to open its labour 
market faster, or even lift all restrictions immediately, if it chose to do so. 
 
Germany  and  other  countries  who  have  not  yet  introduced  full  mobility  from  the  2002  round  of 
enlargement would be well advised to apply this approach immediately to attract high-skilled workers 
from the present new member states in Eastern Europe. Germany could introduce an external minimum 
wage of €30,000 per year for citizens of the new member states in Eastern Europe. For young workers, 
this  threshold  could  even  be  set  somewhat  lower,  at  €24,000.  As  a  result,  the  low  wage  sector  in 
Germany would  continue  to be  protected for the time being while Germany could start enjoying the 
benefits of skilled migration immediately. Over the next 3 to 5 years, this external minimum wage could 
then be progressively lowered in order to assure a smooth transition to full worker mobility in 2009 or 
2011. 
 
*   *   * 
 
While Europe would clearly benefit by attracting more talent from abroad, continued low-skilled migration 
will not necessarily be harmful. In this brief, it has merely been argued that the complex issue of low-
skilled migration should not hold us back in finding a better approach to skilled migration. 
 
By the same token, the introduction of better integration policies is a no-brainer that must not be delayed 
by  the  continuing  complex  discussion  of  how  restrictive  or  liberal  migration  policies  for  low-skilled 
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